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The paper shows why and how the excessive use of commercial paper
by financial institutions and corporations contributed to the vulnerability
of the Korean economy to external shocks. We review the unfolding
process of the Korean currency crisis, focusing on the role of the
commercial paper. We examine how the excessive utilization of
commercial paper led to bad credit equilibria in both financial and
corporate sectors. We investigate the underlying institutional and market
factors leading to the abnormal utilization of commercial paper before
the Korean currency crisis erupted in November 1997. The factors
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1. INTRODUCTION
Although the essence of the Korean currency crisis was a sudden reversal
of capital flows, the Korean economy  was  already exhibiting bad credit
equilibria due to a number of structural weaknesses in both the financial and
corporate sectors before the currency crisis broke out in November 1997.
1) A
substantial slowdown in exports since 1996 caused continuing bankruptcies of
large chaebols and other financial crises. Furthermore, bad credit then led the
Korean to  fall into the full-scale economic crisis by January 1998, only two
months after the eruption of the currency crisis.
Financial market liberalization that was begun in 1993 resulted in financial
institutions and corporations exploiting the CP market. However, this high
concentration on commercial paper increased their riskiness, particularly for
the 6-30
th largest chaebols, and  merchant banks.  Moreover, after capital
market liberalization in 1993-94, the financial institutions raised  huge
amounts of short-term funds offshore, and then lent them to the chaebols.
These resulted in both real and financial sectors highly exposed to external
shocks.  Large chaebols such as Hanbo, Sami, and Kia, which heavily relied
on CP to finance their low profit investments, eventually declared bankruptcy.
Despite its significance, there are only  a few studies on why and how
commercial market was excessively used, and how this made the Korean
economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks. In this paper, we
investigate the underlying institutional problems and domestic market factors
of the abnormal utilization of commercial paper before the currency crisis
erupted in November 1997. In addition, we show how this abnormality led the
economy to bad credit equilibria, making it extremely vulnerable to swings of
sentiments in the international capital markets. We also hope that the findings
of this paper will provide some insight as to why and how large maturity
mismatches and excessive short-term foreign capital borrowings happened in
Korea.
Bisignano (1999), Borensztein and Lee (1999), Chang, et al. (1998), Kawai
††††††††††††††
1)  As for structural weaknesses, high wage, high rent, appreciation of won, the high debt-
equity ratio with low profitability in Korean firms, and huge bad loans in Korean
financial institutions are often noted.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 327
(1998), Kim (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Rodrik and Velasco (1999),
and Taylor (1998) have pointed out that lax supervisions and moral hazards
led the Korean merchant banks, the principal financial intermediaries in the
commercial paper market, to borrow excessive short-term capital offshore,
triggering the currency crisis.  However, these studies did not systematically
analyze the institutional and market factors causing the abnormal utilization
of commercial paper and its consequences to the Korean economy.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the unfolding process
of the Korean currency crisis, focusing  on the role of the commercial paper
market in the crisis. Chapter 3 will examine how the excessive utilization of
commercial paper led to bad credit equilibria in both financial and corporate
sectors. Chapter 4 analyzes the underlying institutional and market factors of
the abnormal utilization of commercial paper by Korean commercial banks,
merchant banks and corporations and its implications to the Korean economy.
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes and draws some policy implications.
2. THE UNFOLDING PROCESS OF THE KOREAN
CURRENCY CRISIS AND THE COMMERCIAL
PAPER MARKET
Since January 1997, the Hanbo Group, the Sammi group, and the Hanshin
Construction Company have gone bankrupt under the weight of massive debt,
leaving 1.86 trillion won of bad loans. Spirits vendor Jinro and textile giant
Daenong were in receivership after defaulting 1.8 trillion won.  On July 15th,
one of  the country’s  top three automaker, Kia Group, defaulted on 12.3
trillion won in debt. The corporation later had to go into court receivership. 
These defaults by large chaebols resulted in a severe cash crunch in the
Korean banking system. B y  September 1997, the total amount of bad and
non-performing loans in deposit banks reached 28.5 trillion won.  Merchant
banks were also in serious trouble – they had over 8 trillion won of bad loans,
including 1.2 trillion won to Jinro; 4.2 trillion won to Kia group; and
staggering losses in Southeast Asian countries. It was alleged that the bad
loans could wipe out the aggregate capitalization of some merchant banks.Sungsup Ra and Gong Yan 328
For example, the bad loan to the Kia group accounted for 183.6 percent of the

































































    Note: 1) Rollover rate of foreign debts in eight large commercial banks available from Bank
of  Korea.
                   2) Spot Rate (won/U.S.D) at the end of the month. In the cases of November and
December, the spot rates of November 28 and December 23 were used.
aggregate capitalization of eight merchant banks based in Seoul, and 75.1
percent of  sixteen regional ones.  With  Kia  Group  defaulting,  Korean
commercial banks, the largest buyer of commercial paper, refused to purchase
and discount the paper dealt and issued by them.
2
International credit rating agencies began to  downgrade credit ratings of
Korean banks.  After Moody lowered the government-owned Korea
Development Bank’s rating on July 30, 1997, Korean banks and corporations
found it increasingly difficult to borrow from abroad (see Figure 1).
As a result, commercial banks, merchant banks, and corporations returned
to the domestic financial and foreign exchange markets to raise funds.  The
commercial banks recalled foreign currency loans from the merchant banks.
This forced the merchant banks to bid by "all-out" efforts for any available
foreign currency (see Table 8). It accelerated the depreciation of won and the
won-dollar exchange fell to an unprecedented low: the US dollar devaluated
from 844.2 at the end of 1996 to 1790 at the end of 1997, depreciating almost
††††††††††††††
2) By the end of August 1997, the worth of commercial paper held by commercial banks
had decreased by 1.7 trillion won. Korean Money, September 1997A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 329
52.8 percent within a year (see Figure 1).
3   This turmoil among  merchant
banks was one of the key reasons behind the sharp fall of the won against the
dollar.
The drastically devaluating won left the Korean government, which had
only about $30 billion in foreign currency reserves after failing to stabilize the
won in the foreign exchange market, unable to repay foreign short-term debts
worth $70 billion, due by the end of 1997. The Korean government pleaded
with the International Monetary Fund for a $ 55 billion bailout to stabilize its
financial system. As one of preconditions, nine ailing merchant banks were
closed.
In summary,  the excessive  use of  commercial paper  significantly
contributed to the crisis in the unfolding process of the Korean currency crisis.
First, the excessive reliance on highly risky commercial paper led the whole
financial system and corporate sector to be extremely vulnerable to adverse
external shocks. For example, after hearing the financial rumors about the Kia
Group, Korean merchant banks recalled commercial paper worth 4.2 trillion
won in a single day in mid-July of 1997 from Kia , which had used it as one of
its main corporate financing source. The recollection of loans pushed  it into
insolvency immediately. This punitive action further squeezed the credit pool
of merchant banks that concentrated about 80 percent of their business on
commercial paper. Second, the exorbitantly mismatched maturity structure of
foreign borrowings of merchant banks, a principal intermediary of the
commercial paper market, accelerated depreciation of the Korean won.
In the next chapter, we will review the effects of the excessive use of
commercial papers to the financial sector, and corporate sector.
††††††††††††††
3) In November and December 1997, the share of the merchant banks’ maturing foreign
debts in the total inter-bank foreign exchange transactions was quite large: twenty one
percent (4.9 billion dollars) and seven percent (1.6 billion dollars) respectively. Maeil
Economic Daily, November 19, 1997.Sungsup Ra and Gong Yan 330
3. BAD CREDIT EQUILIBRIA WITH THE ABNORMAL
UTILIZATION OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
Since its introduction in 1972,
4  taking advantage of lax government
Figure 2  Total Outstanding External Funds in the Corporate Sectors
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Figure 3  The Share Trend of the Total Outstanding External
Funds in the Corporate Sectors
(Unit: percent)
††††††††††††††
4) The Korean government started its ambitious heavy and chemical industries (HCI)
drive since 1972. Financial policies were directed to support the HCI drive.  In order to
provide sufficient funds for the HCI drive by absorbing informal curb market funds,
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regulation and by offering attractive interest rates, the commercial paper
market grew rapidly.
5  
 Figure 2 & 3 show that the outstanding volume and
share of the commercial paper market o f the total (external) funds raised by
the corporate sector have expanded rapidly after the mid- 1980s, particularly
after early 1990s when the advent of the financial market liberalization. The
volume of outstanding funds raised in the CP market expanded more than 7
times from 1991 to 1997, while that of equity only expanded 2.6 times and
bonds 2.6 times. Correspondingly, the share of outstanding funds raised from
the CP market rapidly increased: by the end of March 1997, the share reached
9.7 percent, compared to 11.4 percent from the equity market, 14.1 percent
from the bond market, and 17.5 percent from the bank loan market.
Figure 4  Comparison of M2 and M3
(Unit: 1 trillion won, %)
††††††††††††††
5) After the introduction of the commercial paper (CP) market,  the negotiable certificates
of deposit (CD) market, the commercial bill (CB) sales market and call market in 1975,
and the repurchase agreements (RPs) market in 1977 were introduced. A number of
investment and finance companies (IFCs) and six merchant banks were set up in 1972
and between 1976 and 1979 respectively as the financial intermediaries of money
market businesses. Since the conversion of IFCs into merchant banks was completed
under the Act Concerning the Merger and Conversion of Financial Institutions, twenty
six IFCs were converted into merchant banks in 1994 and 1996.  Thirty merchant banks
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Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, various issues.
In addition, the structure of the Korean financial system has changed since
the early 1980s. This change was driven by the fast growth of the non-
banking financial institutions (NBFIs) at the expense (relatively) of the
banking sector.  Figure 4 shows that M3 grew faster than M2 since the early
1980s. Only after the currency crisis of 1997,  did  the growth rate of M3
become lower than that of M2. This rapid increase of M3 reflects the fast
growth of the Korean money market, particularly the CP market.  Table 1 & 2
shows that the size of the Korean money market was larger than even that of
the advanced nations such as US, Japan, and England. The share of CP market
in the Korea money market has recently been around 40-46%.
Table 1  Comparison of the Size of the Money Markets
                                                                                               (1995, Unit: %)
Korea Japan US England
38.0 22.3 35.7 30.8
 Note: (total short-term financial issues/current GDP) × 100.
 Source: Comparative Economic and Financial Statistics, Bank of Japan, 1997.
Table 2  Composition of the Korean Money Market
(Unit: 100 million won)
1980 1990 1995 1996.6
CP 20,832(81.9) 221,105(40.8) 512,075(41.8) 620,991(46.3)
Call 1,787(7.0) 33,970(6.3) 59,021(4.8) 57,665(4.3)
CD - 68,035(12.6) 249,986(20.4) 232,736(17.3)
RP 1,295(5.1) 33,571(6.2) 60,401(4.9) 60,417(4.5)A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 333
TB 1,500(5.9) 25,000(4,6) 0(0.0) 0(0.0)
MSB 32(0.1) 152,405(28.1) 300,249(24.5) 330,029(24.6)
CB - 180(0.0) 39,984(3.3) 38,650(2.9)
Trade Bonds - 7,529(1.4) 3,852(0.3) 1,771(1.1)
Total 25,446(100.0) 541,794(100.0) 1,225,568(100.0) 1,342,259(100.0)
Note:  TB  Stand for Treasury Bonds, and MSB stands for Monetary Stabilization Bonds
Sources: Lee, Taebong, "The Reform of the Money Market," 1996. (in Korean)
Some problems associated with the structural change caused bad credit
equilibria, leaving the entire Korean economy extremely susceptible to
external shocks. We will examine how the excessive use of commercial paper
led to bad credit equilibria in both financial and corporate sectors.
3.1. Commercial Banks
As liberalization of long-term deposit rates preceded that of short-term ones
in the early 1990s, deposit interest rates of trust accounts increased and
interest rate differentials between money in trust and time became higher (see
Table 15). As a result, the deposit share of trust accounts in commercial banks
jumped up: doubling from 1990 to 1995 (Figure 5).
Due to this rapid increase of the share of long-term assets, the commercial
banks faced higher costs for raising capitals. Meanwhile, because of tight
government control, the banks were not able to raise their lending rates to
cover the increase in capital raising costs. Banks invested the funds raised by
the trust accounts in high profit short-term financial instruments such as CP.
As the government relaxed regulation concerning the portfolio management
of trust account in October 1993, the banks increased their share of short-term
securities, particularly CP, in the portfolio management of trust account’s
assets. Figure 3-4 shows that the share of other securities (mainly CP)
increased from 16.9 % (9.8 trillion won) in 1990, to 22.8% (30 trillion won)
in 1993 and 29.3 % (84.3 trillion won) in 1996.  The commercial banks were
the biggest buyer of the paper: the market share held by commercial banks
Figure 5  Share and Asset’s Structure of Trust Account
in Commercial Banks
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Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, various issues.
was around 60%, followed by 20% held by pension funds and insurance
companies in recent years. As a result, the maturity structure of liabilities
became longer, while that of assets became shorter in the banking sector. This
increased the maturity and interest rate risks of the banking sector.
On the other hand, until 1993, the bank loans had played a dominant role as
the main supplier of corporate funds. Thereafter, the relative importance of
bank loans decreased. In fact,  from 1990 to 1996, the average growth of
banking loans made by deposit money banks decreased from 24.8 percent in
1990 to 14.2 percent in 1996 (see Figure 6).  This forced the corporations to
rely more heavily on other sources of funds, particularly CP.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 335
3.2. Merchant Banks
In Korea, merchant banks, modeled after the British merchant bank, have
been principal financial intermediaries in the money market. These merchant
banks mainly raised funds by direct and indirect borrowing in both domestic
and foreign markets, issuing their own commercial paper and selling Cash
Management Accounts (CMA). Their main business focused on discounting
and dealing commercial paper, bonds, and other securities; and obtaining
foreign capital for lending to corporations.  Their principal financial product
was commercial paper. Table 1 & 2 shows the relative size of Korean money
market and that of the CP market in Korean money market. The relative size
Table 3  Sources of Capital Funds of Merchant Banks
(Unit: 100 million won)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996






























































Total 28,632 41,684 48,135 59,069 77,851 153,282
Note: Borrowings = short-term borrowings (domestic currency) + short-term borrowings (foreign
currency) + long-term borrowings
Long-term borrowings = long-term borrowings (domestic currency) + long-term borrowings
(foreign currency) + other long-term borrowings
Others = long-term liquidity borrowings + long-term foreign liquidity borrowings
Source: Kim (1997).
Table 4  Lendings of Merchant Banks
(Unit: 100 million won)

























































































Note: Numbers in < > indicate the annual growth rate of total lending.
Source: Kim (1997).
of  Korean money market has been bigger than other advanced countries. And
the CP market has been the most important market within money market: the
share of the CP market hovered between 40-47 percent during the 1990s.
Due to high dependence on the CP market and short-term foreign
borrowings, the merchant banks were seriously exposed to interest rate and
maturity risks. Table 3 & 4 show that their asset-liability structures were
seriously mismatched. They raised funds mainly through short-term foreign
borrowings. For example, in 1996, they raised about 10.1 trillion won, 65.7
percent of total funds, by borrowing, as illustrated in Table 5.  Among this, it
is assumed that they borrowed approximately 7.5 trillion won short-term
funds abroad.
6  They made rather long-term loans. In 1996, about 60 percent
of loans was made in the form of relatively  illiquid assets: lease, foreign
securities, and factoring.
7  As the commercial paper market has rapidly grown,
merchant banks even borrowed from the call market. Table 6 shows that the
merchant banks even began to borrow from the call market since 1995,
leaving net borrowings of 53 trillion won in 1996 and 269 trillions won in
1997. This causes the asset-liability structure of the merchant banks to be
seriously mismatched.
Moreover, the maturity structure of foreign asset-liability was exorbitantly
mismatched, as well. Table 5 shows that the foreign assets and borrowings
increased rapidly, recording 59 percent growth in 1995 and 49 percent in
1996 respectively. In late 1997, among the $20 billion funds they borrowed
††††††††††††††
6) By the end of 1997, the total funds raised in foreign currency were 13,347 million
dollars. The number is calculated, assuming that 70% of the borrowings was
conservatively made in the short-term form.
7) The share of offshore loan in the total foreign currency loan was known as about 70-
85 %.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 337
Table 5  Foreign Assets and Liabilities of Merchant Banks
(Unit: 100 million dollars, the end of year)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Total Assets 4,123 4,624 5,633 8,971 13,347
Assets abroad 83 66 185 338 2,432
Bonds 16 31 131 274 2,152
Domestic Assets 4,037 4,557 5,436 8,604 10,881
Loans 772 650 571 861 1,426
Lease 3,010 3,747 4,642 7,315 8,935
Total Liabilities 4,123 4,624 5,633 8,971 13,347
Foreign Liabilities 1,774 1,450 1,820 3,872 5,942
Bank loans 730 727 491 435 327
Others 573 283 608 1,910 3,132
Bond issues 437 419 674 1,470 2,388
Domestic
Liabilities 2,345 3,172 3,805 5,095 7,349
Source: Foreign Exchange Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, various issues.
Table 6  Net Borrowings from Call Markets by Merchant Banks
 (Unit: 1 billion won)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Call Money(A) 474,471 361,721 507,801 622,506 351,621
Call Loan (B) 537,266 378,458 505,897 569,618 82,146
Net Borrowings (A-B) 62,795 16,737 -1,904 -52,888 -269,475
Source: Bank of Korea.
Table 7  Foreign Bond Holdings by Merchant Banks
  (Unit: 100 million won)





















Note: RPA = foreign bonds / profitable assets.
Source: Kim (1997).
Table  8  Maturity Structure of Foreign Debts
by Merchant Banks (1997)
 (Unit: 100 million dollars)
July September October
Short-term 12,851 12,453 12,916(64.4%)
Long-term 7,508 7,583 7,129(35.6%) Borrowing
Total 20,089 20,037 20,045(100%)Sungsup Ra and Gong Yan 338
Short-term 4,077 3,147 3,282(16.3%)
Long-term 16,120 16,890 16,763(83.7%) Loans
Total 20,089 20,037 20,045(100%)
Source: Ministry of Economy and Finance.
abroad, they made up to $16 billion long-term investments, but only $4 billion
short-term investment. The merchant banks invested their short-term
borrowings to the less liquid assets such as lease loans and foreign bond
holdings. The foreign bond holdings of merchant banks roughly doubled
every year since 1993, investing to seek high profits but subsequently ending
up with huge losses in Southeast Asia and even Russia.
By the end of October 1997, the bad loan made by eight troubled merchant
banks had far exceeded their paid-in.  These bad loans came from commercial









(B) B/A Ratio, %
Ssangyong 833 18,832 651 78.2
Daehan 3,297 79,653 3,869 117.3
Kyongnam 590 19,712 998 169.2
Koryo 679 33,154 891 131.2
Hangil 588 32,701 661 112.4
Samsung 1,301 47,542 2,841 218.4
Yeungnam 693 16,602 812 117.2
Kyongil 268 8,774 322 120.1
Source: Munhwa Ilbo, November 26, 1997.
























1987 12.7 59.1 8.3 - - - -
1988 12.8 68.2 11.6 6.8 4.1 103.1 39.4
1989 13.8 73.1 18.3 6.0 2.5 103.7 38.5A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 339
1990 15.0 77.1 10.7 6.5 2.3 99.4 42.8
1991 15.4 81.8 6.9 6.6 1.8 95.8 44.6
1992 14.5 86.7 8.8 6.6 1.5 92.8 47.2
1993 13.7 88.4 5.8 7.0 1.7 94.1 46.8
1994 15.6 91.5 8.7 7.7 2.7 94.6 44.5
1995 16.6 100.0 5.2 8.3 3.6 95.4 44.8
1996 16.8 107.6 7.0 6.5 1.0 91.9 47.7
1997 14.1 113.8 0.7 8.3 -0.3 91.8 54.2
Note: 1) Operation income = gross profits – marketing and general administrative expenses.
          2) Ordinary income = operating costs + net non-operating income
Sources: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, various issues.
 Financial Statement Analysis, Bank of Korea, various issues.
papers defaulted by corporations, especially big chaebols such as Kia, Jinro,
and so on (see Table 9). The bad and non-performing loans snowballed to 5.6
trillion won at the end of 1998, 20 percent of the total loans, jumping over
100 percent from the end of 1997.
3.3. Corporate Sectors
Commercial paper (CP) is characterized as highly liquid – normally within 90
days, carrying a high risk – an unsecured promissory note, and at high cost.
Therefore, commercial paper has normally been used as “bridge financing”.
Disregarding these risks, Korean corporations actively employed commercial
paper as an important source to raise long-term funds for facility investment
by issuing and rolling over commercial paper. This borrowing short and
investing long exposed corporation to maturity risk, and by currently rolling
over the paper, also made them vulnerable to rollover risk. Compared with 0.1
percent in Germany, 1.2 percent in the United States, and 0.9 percent in Japan,
8  Korean manufacturing corporations raised 17.5 percent of funds from the
CP market in 1996.
Table 11  Sources of External Funds Raised by the Corporate Sectors
(Unit: 1 trillion won, %)
Total Indirect
Financing
Direct Financing Foreign Others
††††††††††††††
8) Taken from the Bank of Korea’s report.Sungsup Ra and Gong Yan 340
CP Stocks Bonds
1987 18.87(100) 7.20(38.2) -0.34(-1.8) 4.90(26.0) 1.21(6.4)   -0.09(-0.5) 5.93(31.7)
1988 21.44(100) 5.19(24.2) 1.16(5.4) 7.68(35.8) 1.41(6.6) 1.21(5.6) 4.79(22.3)
1989 38.88(100) 13.66(35.5) 5.13(13.3) 9.58(24.9) 4.93(12.8) -0.18(-0.5) 5.36(13.9)
1990 50.75(100) 19.47(38.4) 1.90(3.7) 7.19(14.2) 10.93(21.5) 3.25(6.4) 8.01(15.8)
1991 58.18(100) 24.34(41.8) -2.21(-3.8) 8.77(15.9) 14.07(24.2) 2.40(4.1) 10.82(18.6)
1992 54.89(100) 19.91(36.3) 4.18(7.6) 8.74(15.9) 6.6(12.0) 2.53(4.6) 11.55(21.0)
1993 64.89(100) 20.37(31.3) 9.02(13.9) 9.54(14.7) 9.45(14.5) -1.45(-2.2) 13.92(21.4)
1994 89.04(100) 39.65(44.5) 4.41(7.6) 13.20(14.8) 12.61(14.2) 4.41(5.0) 11.39(21.4)
1995 100.19(100) 31.87(31.8) 16.10(16.1) 14.44(14.4) 15.35(15.3) 5.57(5.6) 11.27(11.2)
1996 118.77(100) 34.57(29.1) 20.74(17.5) 12.98(10.9) 21.21(17.9) 12.38(10.4) 16.04(13.5)
1997 117.04(100) 44.36(37.9) 4.77 (4.1) 8.97(7.7) 26.85(22.9) 7.16(6.1) 22.71(19.4)
Note: 1) Total external funds newly raised by the corporate sectors each year.
          2) The corporate sector includes both private and public corporations.
Source: Flow of Funds, Bank of Korea, various issues.
With the boom in exports, there was a dramatic increase in facility
investment  by Korean manufacturing corporations during 1986-1988 and
1993-1995 (see Table 10). Preferring debt financing to equity financing even
during the 1993-5 boom period,
9  they increased their external borrowings for
investment. As a result, the leverage (total debt/total equity) ratio of the
corporate sector, which had declined to around 200 percent in 1989 since it
recorded the highest level of around 490 percent in 1980, climbed up to
around 400 percent in 1997 again.
10  Since 1989, the share of short-term
leverage in the total corporate debts remained dominant and increased steadily,
occupying around 40-44 percent. The long-term leverage was around 24-27
percent during the period (see Table 12).
Table 12   Leverage of the Corporate Sectors
(Unit: 1 billion won)
Leverage Ratio 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Short-term 175.5 190.2 200.0 182.3 188.4 179.1 191.6 232.6
Long-term 110.0 116.0 118.6 112.5 114.0 107.6 125.4 163.2
††††††††††††††
9) This is in contradiction to an implication of the agency cost theory: the higher the
growth rate, the lower  the leverage.
10) The leverage level of corporate sectors in 1997 was 153.8% in US, 186.4% Japan, and
85.7% Taiwan.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 341
Total 285.5 306.2 318.7 274.8 302.5 286.7 317.1 396.2
Source: Flow of Funds, Bank of Korea, various issues.
Among the corporations, the capital structure changed noticeable after the
government implemented financial market liberalization. Lee and Lee (1999)
show that the leverage increased more quickly for the group of the 6-30
th
chaebols, compared to the group of the top 5 chaebols and the groups of the
non-chaebol corporations. Since the 1993 capital liberalization, the leverage
and debt structure of the top 5 chaebols improved, while that of the other two
groups deteriorated. As the capital market opening allowed the top 5 chaebols
with good credit rating to raise funds abroad easily, their foreign borrowings
significantly increased: helping the long term leverage and capital raising
costs lower. However, the other two groups, not having good credit ratings,
had to resort to domestic market, which had then more room for them as the
top 5 chaebols began to borrow abroad.
The 6-30 largest chaebols took advantage of the slack in the credit
market,
11  leading them to the higher short-term leverage and financial costs.
The higher reliance on short-term debt caused their financial structure and
profitability to worsen compared to the top 5 chaebols. The financial
institutions, as well, were exposed to high interest rate risks. In summary, the
financial market liberalization gave a positive effect on the leverage structure
of the top 5 chaebols, while it provided an adverse effect on the 6-30 chaebols.
This increased the fragility of the 6-30 chaebols, which depended on CP for
raising funds. When the economy was hit by the adverse terms of trade shocks
in 1996 and 1997, these corporations were not able to adjust to adverse shocks.
Summing up, the corporation sector increased its use of commercial paper,
especially in the early 1990s.  This is due to a drastic need for investment
funding, and an adverse effect of the financial market liberalization during the
period.  As a consequence of the excessive utilization of commercial paper,
the maturity and debt structure of the corporations, particularly the 6-30
th
chaebols’, seriously worsened, resulting to a precarious financial state.
 12
††††††††††††††
11) Part of their advantage might come from the fact that many of the 6-30
 largest
chaebols  had their own NBFIs.
12) Of course, structural factors such as high wage, over-valued won and so on, leading to
weakening of the Korean economy, should be considered. However, we only focus onSungsup Ra and Gong Yan 342
In the next Chapter 4, we will delve into which institutional and market
factors led the abnormal utilization of commercial paper.
4. INSTITUTIONAL AND MARKET FACTORS OF THE
ABNORMAL UTILIZATION OF COMMERCIAL PAPER
4.1. Institutional Factors: Asymmetric Financial Deregulation
When merchant banks grew rapidly, and started to compete head-to-head
with commercial banks for various funds, the government implemented
several measures to promote the banking institutions’ competitiveness against
non-bank financial intermediaries since the banking system was deemed to be
of primary importance for the strategic industries in Korea. Merchant banks,
being  deemed  secondary financial institutions,  were  subject to looser
government control. In summary, it is right to say that no policy measure was
taken for the sake of merchant banking industry since their introduction.
There was virtually no supervision on merchant banks –  even  though this
helped the merchant banks grow rapidly, it also caused a huge accumulation
of foreign debt.   
4.1.1. Interest Rate Differentials
To attract funds from curb market and to provide sufficient funds for the
ambitious Heavy and Chemical Industry Policy, the interest rates and
management of the merchant banks were less controlled, comparing to
commercial banks. This led the commercial paper market to grow rapidly.
When the Korean government implemented a four-stage plan for interest rate
deregulation starting in 1991, the sequence of interest rate deregulation was
not carefully programmed, causing interest rate differentials between banking
and non-banking financial institutions, resulting in excessive use of CP.
The deregulation of interest rate was progressed asymmetrically. As the
deregulation of long-term deposit interest rates preceded that of short-term
††††††††††††††† ††††††††††††††† †††
the issues directly related to the excessive utilization of CP.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 343
interest rates, the share of the trust accounts and CD in the banking sector
rapidly increased. This tendency accelerated when regulation on the share of
bondholdings in the trust accounts was relaxed in October 1993. To
compensate the resultant high capital raising costs, the banks pursued more
profitable short-term financial products such as CP, rather than long-term
products. Table 13 shows that the interest rates of the trust accounts in the
banking sector were higher than those of time deposits for all years except
1997.
The deregulation of the long-term lending interest rates was implemented
in reverse order. The interest rates of short-term financial products such CP
and draft loans were deregulated in November 1991 before that of long-term
products. All lending interest rates except for policy loans were officially
deregulated in November 1993, when the second stage of interest rates
deregulation program was implemented. However, it seems that bank loans
Table 13  The Comparison of Deposit Interest Rates between
Money in Trust and Time
(Unit: percent)
Year Money in Trust Time Deposit
(6 months to less 1 yr)
Time Deposit
(1 to less 2 yrs)
1991 13.7 6.0 10.0
1992 14.2 6.0 10.0
1993 13.1 5.0 8.5
1994 12.7 5.0 8.5
1995 12.3 7.0 8.5
1996 12.5 9.4 9.5
1997 12.5 13.9 9.1
   Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, various issues.
Table 14  The Comparison of Interest Rates between Bank Loan,
Short-term Financing Instruments and Bonds
(Unit: percent)
Year Curb Market Bank Loan Over-drafts Call Loan CP CD CB Bond
1991 23.4 11.2 13.5 16.8 15.4 18.4 15.4 19.0
1992 23.9 11.2 12.5 13.5 14.0 15.2 14.0 14.0
1993 20.8 10.2 11.3 11.5 12.0 12.3 12.0 12.2
1994 19.4 11.5 12.0 14.1 15.3 14.9 14.3 14.2Sungsup Ra and Gong Yan 344
1995 20.8 10.7 14.3 10.9 12.9 11.7 12.2 11.7
1996 - 11.1 14.7 12.5 13.5 13.5 12.8 12.6
1997 - 15.3 37.5 21.3 16.9 18.6 13.3 24.3
  Note: The interest rate of CP is averaged and that of bond is the O.C.T. rate.
  Sources: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, various issues; and the curb market rate is
unofficial survey data available from Bank of Korea.
continued subject to government administrative guidance.
13  In contrast to
bank loans, the regulation and administrative guidance on CP was almost
completely liberalized around 1993-94.
14  As a result, the investors preferred
CP since they could earn higher interest rates. Banks largely invest the funds
raised by the trust accounts in the commercial paper market. Table 14 shows
that the disparities between interest rates of short-term financial instruments
such as overdrafts, call loan, and CD, etc., have been much higher than that of
banking loan, which has been relatively stable under the government’s control.
4.1.2. Lower Entry Barriers
Entry into the banking sector was strictly controlled. However, entry in the
merchant banking sector (including investment finance companies) was often
allowed. The rapid increase of the number of the CP market participants
helped to boost the growth of  the CP market. While twenty-two short-term
finance companies, six merchant banks, and two investment trust companies
were permitted during 1972-82, only two banks, Shinhan bank in 1982, and
Hanmi in 1983, were established during the same period.  After the late 80s,
the government worried about the weakening competitiveness of banks,  only
three banks, Donghwa, Dongnam, and Daedong, were introduced. However,
five local investment trust companies were also established. In 1990s, twenty-
six investment finance companies (IFCs) were converted into merchant banks
in 1994 and 1996. Since the second conversion of local investment and
finance companies into merchant banks was made in 1994, the business
††††††††††††††
13) Even after the second stage of interest rates deregulation program in November 1993,
the prime interest rate was lower than the interest rate of corporate bonds.  This
abnormality might serve as evidence that the government actively provides
administrative guidance to control the lending interest rates.
14) Refer Bank of Korea (1999), pp. 69-71.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 345
environment of merchant banks, particularly for newly licensed entrants,
greatly deteriorated. Taking advantage of the capital market liberalization,
these inexperienced merchant banks recklessly sought a new business
opportunity in international financial market.
4.1.3. Lower Credit Rating Requirement
Since CP is a high risky unsecured promissory note, only highly credit
rated corporations are generally eligible to issue it. However, even a
corporation that belongs to the speculative grade category has become able to
issue CP in Korea. In contrast, in the US and Japan, only a firm that belongs
to the investment grade category is allowed to issue it.
15  This relatively low
credit rating requirement helped the Korean corporations to exploit the CP
market.  For example, Hanbo Steel got a B+ as its credit grade and it was able
to issue CP right before its bankruptcy in January 1997 (Appendix 3).
4.1.4. Relaxed Supervision
After the government implemented financial market liberalization measures
in 1993, supervision of merchant banks, unlike that of the deposit banks, was
virtually non-existent.
16  The liberalization of short-term money market
without preparing proper financial market infrastructure distorted the financial
market structure. For example, paper traded in the deal-placed market was
illegally endorsed by merchant banks. Moreover, supervision on reckless
foreign borrowings and investment by the inexperienced merchant banks was
lax. Some merchant banks practiced illegal dealings of commercial paper.
They sold commercial papers issued by low credit rated corporations as those
issued by high credit rated corporations. By withholding the CP certificates,
they also resold commercial paper repeatedly to a number of customers.
4.1.5. Procedural Convenience
Procedural convenience also led the Korean corporations to depend on CP
††††††††††††††
15) Japan Only a firm rated above P-2 from Moody’s or A-2 from Standard & Poors in
US and A-3 in respectively is eligible to issue CP.
16) This is attributable to lack of understandings of the government about the money
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to raise funds. Unlike issuing bonds and equity in financial markets,
corporations can bypass financial intermediaries to raise funds in the direct
commercial paper market. Thus they not only  avoided paying fees to banks,
but they also negotiated directly with investors with regard to interest rates
and maturity of the paper. Also, since the commercial paper is a non-secured
promissory note buttressed by the issuer’s reputation or credit standing, the
procedure to issue the paper is much more convenient than to issue bonds or
equity, not to mention the difficulty to borrow from commercial banks.
4.2. Market Related Factors
Due to a huge wage hike in 1989, Korean corporations have had difficulty
sustaining their international competitiveness. Coupled with this, it became
difficult to seek monopolistic rents in domestic market as liberalization started.
It became urgent for corporations to improve their international
competitiveness for their survival.  They, particularly large firms, made  an
effort to convert into labor-saving and high value-added activities, by making
aggressive investments in heavy and chemical industries whenever the
conditions allowed.  Even during 1994-95, when export was strong, the total
borrowings of large corporations increased, indicating that they made more
investments than what they earned, instead of improving their leverage
structures (see Table 10, 11, 12). They did not stop investing in 1996 when
the external conditions worsened. They continued to invest through debt
financing, causing the level of corporate capital inadequacy seriously
worsened.  Here we investigate the factors that led the corporate sector to rely
on debt financing, particularly the CP market.
4.2.1. Capital Inadequacy
With adverse terms of trade, capital inadequacy was greatly aggravated,
particularly in 1996 (see Table 10 & 11). Aggressive corporate investments
since 1993 were done for two main reasons. First, the corporations had to
deal with the worsened structural weaknesses, often noted as three “highs”:
high wage, high land price, and high financial expenses, especially following
after sharp increases in real wage and land price during 1988-90. Second, as
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faced new domestic and foreign entrants in the once well-protected domestic
market. To overcome this difficulty, Korean corporations invested, to
upgrade and/or expand their production facility to enhance their
competitiveness in both domestic and international markets, taking advantage
of strong exports during 1994-5. Table 10 shows that Korean corporations
made aggressive facility investment starting from 1994 and continued even
until 1996 when external conditions were very much deteriorated. They
heavily relied on the CP market particularly during 1995-6.  In 1996 right
before the crisis broke out, the share of total borrowings was at an all time
high (see Table 11).
4.2.2. Sluggish Stock Market
Korean stock exchange market has been sluggish, making equity financing
less attractive. Both  trading volume and stock price index  have decreased
sharply since 1989.  Though the stock market showed a sign of resurgence
during 1993-4 as the economy recovered, it was short-lived.  Trading volume
dropped sharply from 229.8 trillion won in 1994 to 142 trillion won in 1996.
And the stock market index dropped from 965.7 in 1994 to 833.4 in 1996.
4.2.3. Tight M2 Control
Even  after financial market liberalization, the monetary authorities have
kept using M2 growth as the intermediate monetary target variable. This rigid
monetary target deprives the authorities of flexibility. To manage the  M2
target, the interest rates deregulation of the non-M2 financial products such as
CP was preceded. This resulted in a  (relative)  weakening of the banking
sector.  As  shown in  Figure 3-3, while the average growth of M 3 was kept
relatively higher, that of M 2 declined until 1997.  The growth rate of M2
decreased from 21 percent in 1990 to 15-16 percent range for 1994-96.
Meanwhile, the growth rate of M3 was higher than that of M2:  22 percent
during 1993-94 and 19-20 percent during 1995-96. This indicates that bank
loans have been relatively reduced, resulting in  less availability of funds for
the corporate sector.  Therefore, they sought alternatives to meet their
aggressive equipment investments during 1993-96.
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Chaebols are owned and managed by single families rather than public-
owned, and managed by professional managers. Chaebol founding families
tend to be reluctant to relinquish the ownership of the company. Therefore
they were reluctant to disperse ownership and raise corporate funds by issuing
equities, even though portfolio diversification could help reduce the financing
risks.
4.2.5. Tax Subsidies
The corporations can save capital raising costs by raising funds in the CP
market or through bank loans than equity market as Korean Corporation Tax
offers a tax subsidy on debt. The company’s payments of interest on debt are
regarded as a cost and are deducted from taxable income. The interest is paid
from before-tax income, while dividend of e quity is paid from after-tax
income.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have discussed the abnormal utilization of CP by Korean merchant
banks, commercial banks and corporations: they indiscriminately  issued and
rolled over commercial paper, exposing themselves to both liquidity and
maturity risks. When adverse external shocks hit  the Korean economy, the
precarious health of these firms triggered the currency crisis. And it explains
why the currency crisis quickly developed into a full-blown economic crisis.
We also identified that the fundamental reasons for the indiscriminate use of
CP, including an asymmetric government intervention in the financial system
and high demand for funds by the corporate sector.
The abnormal expansion of the commercial paper satisfied all market
participants’ interests when the economy was good. The merchant banks
earned fees from discounting and selling CP. While the commercial banks
enchant profits in the CP market through its trust accounts with less default
risk achieved by shifting its risk to merchant banks. The government, sticking
to M2 target, eased the increasing money demand pressure without increasing
its  monetary base. As a result, the excessive and rapid expansion of CP
market went unchecked.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 349
The policy implications are drawn as follow:
First, the proper sequence of financial market liberalization is important to
prevent unnecessary financial turmoil. In Korea, as the ill-designed sequence
of interest rate deregulation caused interest rate differentials between banking
and non-banking financial institutions, the share of short-term financing in the
corporate finance rapidly increased. And this made the corporations extremely
vulnerable to sudden swings of external shocks.  Plus, as we discussed, the
1993 capital market opening only helped the top 5 chaebols, which had good
reputations abroad, and lowered their financial costs and short-term leverage.
If the openings of domestic corporate bond and/or commercial loans markets
had preceded, it would have improved the leverage and debt structure of the
6-30
th chaebols and others.
Second, a well-designed preparation of good financial infrastructure is
extremely important to reap desirable outcomes from the liberalization of the
money market. The rapid share increase of money market increased risks of
the entire financial system in Korea. Without preparing a good credit rating
system, money market was liberalized. The banks made investment even with
the poor credit ratings done by merchant banks and/or credit rating agencies.
The following example illustrates the poor performance of the Korean credit
rating companies. The Korea Investors Service, a credit rating agency
evaluated that the eligible corporations (above B class) for issuing bonds was
about 57.4 percent among the total registered companies in Korea stock
market in 1997 while Moody had only 22 percent as eligible. Failing to
prepare for an internationally acceptable credit rating system, the companies
were seriously affected by foreign investors’ panic when information started
to be disclosed.
Third, as an intermediate monetary target variable, it would be desirable to
use M3 (or MCT) rather than M2 even  for a developing country like Korea
when it has a relatively large money market. Though the effectiveness of M2
as an intermediate target  was  seriously weakened as the money market
became increasingly important, the authorities kept using M2 and thus failed
to respond the changes in the financial environment.
Last, the Korean crisis highlights not only the importance of equity markets
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CD, TB, and so on. While the size of issuing markets for these short-term
financial instruments was relatively large, the secondary markets for these
instruments were not adequately developed. For example, during 1995, the
velocity of CD and short-term discounted TB were 54.1 and 144.5
respectively in Japan, that of CD and Monetary Stabilization Bonds were 4.4
and 0.01. When financial institutions faced liquidity problem, this prevented
them from utilizing their holdings of short-term financial instruments for
meeting liquidity needs.A Catalyst of the Korean Currency Crisis 351
APPENDIX
Appendix 1  Comparison of Business of the U.S. Investment Bank, U.K.
Merchant Bank and Korea Merchant Bank
Investment Bank (U.S.) Merchant Bank (U.K) Merchant Bank (Korea)
Deposit/Loan
X O X
mid and long-term loans





bonds are only allowed
Investment trust O O O





Guarantee O O O
Factoring O O O
Issuing Bonds O O O
M&A O O O
Lease O O O
Source: Author’s modification from Kim (1997).
Appendix 2  Liberalization Measures Taken for CP Market
Date Liberalization Measures
August 1972 Establishment of the CP market
December 1988
Interest rate liberalization – the issue ceiling for CP was liberalized.
Introduction of a new type of CP-a  high value faced CP (minimum unit: 30
million won)
November 1991
Interest rate liberalization - the sales ceiling for a high value faced CP was
liberalized.
the issue ceiling for all kinds of CPs was removed.
July 1994 –
 November 1995
Minimum unit for a high value faced CP was relaxed to 20 million and 10
million won respectively.
July 1997
Interest rate liberalization  – the sales ceiling of all kinds of CPs was
removed.
Minimum unit for a high value faced CP was finally removed.
August 1997-
 June 1998
Allowing security companies, commercial banks and investment trust
companies for the CP business
Source: Bank of Korea (1999).Sungsup Ra and Gong Yan 352
Appendix 3  Credit Ratings of Selected Corporations Bankrupted or
in for Court Receivership in 1997
Date of
bankrupcy 97.7 97.1 96.7 96.1 95 94 93 92 91
Hanbo Steel 97/1/25 D D B+ B+ B+ B+ A3 A3 A3 A3
Sammi 97/3/20 B B+ B- B- B- B- B B B+ B+ A2-
Jinro 97/9/9 D D A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- A3+
Daenong 97/9/12 B+ B+ B+ B+ B+ B B+ B+ B+ A3-
Hanshin
Construction 97/5/31 D B- B B B A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- B+ B-
Kia Auto 97/9/23 A2+ A2+ A2+ A2+ A2 A2+ A2 A2+ A1 A1
Kia Steel 97/9/23 B+ B+ A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- A3- A3+ A3+
Saangbang-wool 97/10/16 A2+A2+ A2+ A2+A2+A2+A2+A2+A2+A2+A2+A2+A2+ A2
Haitai 97/11/3 A3+A3+ A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2-
Halla
Construction 97/12/8 A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A2- A3 A3 A3- A3- A3-
Source: Credit Ratings, Korea Investors Service, various issues.
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